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Printable Version: RFC2244.PDF
RFC 2244 ACAP November 1997 ACAP clients are encouraged to consider the security problems involved with a lab computer situation. Specifically, a client cache of ACAP configuration information MUST NOT allow access by an unauthorized user. One way to assure this is for an ACAP client to be able to completely flush any non-public cached configuration data when a user leaves. As laptop computers can be easily stolen and a cache of configuration data may contain sensitive information, a disconnected mode ACAP client may wish to encrypt and password protect cached configuration information. 11. Acknowledgments Many thanks to the follow people who have contributed to ACAP over the past four years: Wallace Colyer, Mark Crispin, Jack DeWinter, Rob Earhart, Ned Freed, Randy Gellens, Terry Gray, J. S. Greenfield, Steve Dorner, Steve Hole, Steve Hubert, Dave Roberts, Bart Schaefer, Matt Wall and other participants of the IETF ACAP working group. 12. Authors' Addresses Chris Newman Innosoft International, Inc. 1050 Lakes Drive West Covina, CA 91790 USA Email: chris.newman@innosoft.com John Gardiner Myers Netscape Communications 501 East Middlefield Road Mail Stop MV-029 Mountain View, CA 94043 Email: jgmyers@netscape.com Newman & Myers Standards Track [Page 63]